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Our decisions often have consequences for other people. Hence, self-interest and
other-regarding motives are traded off in many daily-life situations. Interindividually, people
differ in their tendency to behave prosocial. These differences are captured by the
concept of social value orientation (SVO), which assumes stable, trait-like tendencies to
act selfish or prosocial. This study investigates group differences in prosocial decision
making and addresses the question of whether prosocial individuals act intuitively and
selfish individuals instead need to control egoistic impulses to behave prosocially. We
address this question via the interpretation of neuronal and behavioral indicators. In the
present fMRI-study participants were grouped into prosocial- and selfish participants.
They made decisions in multiple modified Dictator-Games (DG) that addressed self- and
other-regarding motives to a varying extent (self gain, non-costly social gain, mutual
gain, costly social gain). Selfish participants reacted faster than prosocial participants
in all conditions, except for decisions in the non-costly social condition, in which
selfish participants displayed the longest decision times. In the total sample we found
enhanced neural activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex (dmPFC/BA 9) during decisions that resulted in non-costly social benefits.
These areas have been implicated in cognitive control processes and deliberative value
integration. Decisively, these effects were stronger in the group of selfish individuals.
We believe that selfish individuals require more explicit and deliberative processing
during prosocial decisions. Our results are compatible with the assumption that prosocial
decisions in prosocials are more intuitive, whereas they demand more active reflection in
selfish individuals.
Keywords: prosocial decision making, interindividual differences, SVO, egoistic default, valuation, cognitive
control
INTRODUCTION
Prosocial behavior, i.e., behavior which benefits other individuals
is a relative unique human ability. There is an ongoing scientific
debate to what extent prosocial behavior is based on intuition or
on conscious reasoning (Fehr and Camerer, 2007). Recent studies
suggest that this might strongly depend on personality traits, and
that individuals with a tendency to act prosocial (“prosocials”)
do so intuitively, while individuals who have a tendency to act
selfish, sometimes rely on their ability to deliberatively control
their selfish tendencies in order to act prosocial (Bogaert et al.,
2008; Declerck et al., 2013). Neurocognitive research has recently
begun to identify brain processes which are related to prosocial
behavior and they have found that prosocial decisions in persons
with a prosocial personality trait are associated with activity in
subcortical brain regions that have been implied in automated,
intuitive processing (Haruno and Frith, 2010; Haruno et al.,
2014). In the present fMRI study we wanted to investigate brain
processes in selfish individuals which are given the opportunity
to act prosocially without own costs. Under the assumption that
these individuals have a weaker default tendency to act prosocial
we hypothesized that they would need extra cognitive resources to
do somanifesting in longer reaction times and stronger activity in
brain areas that are associated with deliberative decision making
such as the prefrontal cortex.
Standard models of human decisions making assume that
individuals are intuitively self-interested and primarily maximize
their own gain (Camerer, 2003). Therefore, individuals have to
suppress egoistic impulses in order to act prosocially (Knoch
et al., 2006). Compatible with this view, egoistic choices are fast
(Piovesan and Wengström, 2009) and presuambly automated.
On the contrary, a study by Rand and colleagues suggests that
individuals are intuitively prosocial and cooperative (Rand et al.,
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2012). They found that faster decisions result in higher monetary
contributions to a public good than slow decisions.
Studies that take interindividual differences into account, sug-
gest that these conflicting views might be resolved by controlling
for personality traits. The concept “Social Value Orientation”
(SVO) (Van Lange, 1999) considers two kinds of stable (trait-like)
preferences for resource allocation: a prosocial value orienta-
tion, which refers to the preference of maximizing the sum of
resources between self and other, and a proself value orientation,
which refers to the preference of maximizing individual resources.
Cornelissen et al. (2011) studied the effects of social value orien-
tation on prosocial behavior in a dictator-game under cognitive
load during which prosocials transferred more money to the
recipient compared to selfish participants. The authors concluded
that SVO determines behavior when it is based on automatiza-
tion, resulting prosocials to intutiveily act in a prosocial manner
and selfish individuals to intuitively act in an egoistic manner.
Additional support for this view comes from neurocognitive
studies that explore differences in brain acitivity between proso-
cial and selfish individuals (Van den Bos et al., 2009; Haruno and
Frith, 2010; Emonds et al., 2011; Haruno et al., 2014). They found
evidence that behavior and cognition of prosocials are charac-
terized by intuition and automatization. Work by Haruno and
colleagues demonstrated that prosocials rely more on automatic
emotional processing when responding to inequitable monetary
distributions between themselves and others. They found cor-
relates in subcortical structures such as the Amygdala and the
Nucleus Accumbens (Haruno and Frith, 2010; Haruno et al.,
2014). This finding was complemented by another study that pro-
vided evidence for a higher reward value of prosocial decisions in
prosocial-oriented individuals: Van den Bos found higher activity
in the Striatum of prosocials compared to proselfs when recip-
rocating in a Trust game (Van den Bos et al., 2009). Similarly
Emonds et al. (2011) interpreted higher activity in the lateral
orbitofrontal cortex in prosocials during decision making in a
Prisoner‘s Dilemma as neural indicators of intuitive, internalized
moral consideration. Neural indicators for deliberative strategies
and control of egoistic impulses in proselfs are reported in the
same study (Emonds et al., 2011). They found higher activity
in the DLPFC in proselfs for decision making in the Prisoner‘s
Dilemma. The DLPFC has been considered to be an important
brain region for working memory, because it is activated when
humans are under cognitive load. Therefore higher activity in this
brain area might reflect high cognitive effort to fight automatic
egoistic impulses.
Our fMRI study aimed at extending those findings to decision-
making in a non-interactive paradigm. We are interested in the
decision process that underlies the construct of social value orien-
tation and thus implemented a binary choice task that resembles
the structure of the triple dominance measure of SVO (Van
Lange, 1999). Participants choose between two alternatives, each
alternative consisting of a payoff for themselves and another
participant (example see Figure 1). Our paradigm conceptually
resembles a dictator-game (Engel, 2011): decisions affect payoffs
of the decision maker and of another participant (the recipient),
without the recipient having influence on the payoff distribu-
tion. This excludes the possible influence of strategic motives
FIGURE 1 | Chronology of a trial in the paradigm. After the appearance
of the first alternative (A), consisting of a payoff for the decision-maker in
yellow and the receiver in blue, a second alternative appeared and the
subjects chose one alternative (B). The chosen alternative was presented
(C) and the chosen outcomes were either doubled or set to zero with a
50% chance (D). The chronology was the same in each of the 160 trials.
and motives to punish unfair behavior which are effective in
interactive paradigms such as the Ultimatum game (Camerer,
2003).
Our paradigm allowed to study the valuation and integration
of self-interest and prosocial motives and the relative contribution
of different brain structures to prosocial decisions. We expected
prosocials to act intuitively in a prosocial manner, and selfish indi-
viduals to act intuitively in an egoistic manner. Themain question
was how selfish individuals would react in situations in which they
could act prosocially without minimizing their personal benefit.
Either they don’t act prosocially (at most at chance level), or they
act prosocial and need additional cognitive resources to do so.
To answer this question we designed situations (non-costly social
condition) which focus on the payoff maximization of the other
person (by holding the own payoff constant and varying the other
person’s payoff, e.g., choosing between 4/10 and 4/6). Since these
decisions do not lead to monetary losses for the decision-maker,
we expected a high rate of prosocial decisions. Decisions in the
costly social condition entail a conflict between self-interest and
other-regarding motives. In this situation subjects can choose to
forgo a monetary advantage for themselves in order to allocate
more money to the recipient (e.g., favoring 4C for themselves
and 16C for the recipient over 6C for both). In those situations
we expected prosocials participants to behaviourally display their
value for prosocial outcomes by choosing the prosocial alternative
more often compared to selfish individuals.
Our study is able to shed light on the neural correlates under-
lying the decision process of the SVO construct and the relative
contribution of brain areas involved in more automated process-
ing (such as the Nucleus Accumbens and the Amygdala) and brain
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areas involved in higher order reflective processing (such as the
lateral and medial prefrontal cortex) (Satpute and Lieberman,
2006). We wanted to contribute to the question, whether indi-
viduals that value prosociality (i.e., prosocials) primarily act
intuitively, and whether selfish individuals need to control egois-
tic impulses to behave prosocially. We expected prosocials to show
stronger neural correlates of reward and valuation in subcortical
structures of the brain (NAcc, Amygdala), and we expected self-
ish indidivuals to show stronger engagement of prefrontal areas
during prosocial decisions.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Prior to the fMRI experiment, each of our 40 subjects (22
female, mean age = 30.03y, SD = 8.7y) was classified as pro-
self (n = 20) or prosocial (n = 20) based on the Social Value
Orientation decomposed measure (Van Lange, 1999), which was
filled out online. The SVO decomposed measure consists of 9
items. Each item contains three outcome distributions between
oneself and an anonymous other, in this case another partici-
pant of the online-questionnaire (points to self/points to other).
The three outcome distributions of each item correspond to a
prosocial (e.g., 500/500), individualistic (e.g., 600/200) or com-
petitive orientation (e.g., 500/0). Participants were classified as
prosocial when they made at least 6 consistent prosocial choices,
and classified as proself when they made at least 6 consistent
individualistic choices. Competitive choices were too few to be
classified. Participants were classified before the fMRI experiment
to achieve an equal distribution of proself- and prosocial-oriented
participants. Four subjects (all proselfs) had to be excluded from
fMRI-analysis due to excessive head movement. Throughout the
manuscript we use the term selfish to refer to proself individu-
als as defined in the SVO construct. Subjects were native German
speakers, right handed and had no history of psychiatric or neu-
rological disorders. Informed written consent was obtained from
all subjects. The study was approved by the Ethics committee of
the University of Bonn.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE AND PARADIGM
In each of the 160 trials of the fMRI experiment, subjects chose
one of two alternatives, each consisting of a payoff for themselves
and for another participant (Figure 1). Subjects were informed
that the payoff of one randomly chosen trial would be imple-
mented after the experiment (actual payoff). No deception was
used: the selection of the implemented trial was random and the
actual payoffs were transferred to the subjects (decision maker
and another participant as the receiver) and subjects were guar-
anteed anonymity of their decisions.
Subjects were invited in groups of two and took part in the
fMRI-experiment one after another. The choices the subjects
made affected each other; each subject had the role of a dictator
and of a receiver, thus the paradigm corresponds to a role-reversal
dictator game. The randomly chosen actual payoff at the end
of each experiment thus determined a payoff for the decision-
maker (dictator) and a payoff for the other subject of the dyad
as the receiver. The actual payoff for each participant henceforth
consisted of the sum of two randomly chosen decisions: one at
the end of their own experiment, the other at the end of the
other participant’s experiment. The subjects additionally received
a show-up fee of 20 Euro. The subjects didn’t know each other in
advance. They briefly recognized one another before the first sub-
ject entered the scanner in order to demonstrate the receiver to
actually exist. The two participants had no further contact and
didn’t get to know the decisions of each other. We decided to
implement minimal prior contact between the subjects in order
to increase ecological validity. Additional several studies demon-
strated a positive influence of prior contact and of perceived
similarity on cooperative behavior and its neuronal correlates
(Boone et al., 2008, 2010; Mobbs et al., 2009).
The decision-process consisted of three time-points (see
Figure 1). After the appearance of the first alternative showing
a payoff for the decision-maker and the receiver, a second alter-
native appeared and the subjects chose one alternative. After
the choice, we implemented a Reward-Prediction-Error (RPE)
by either doubling the chosen outcomes or setting them to zero
with a 50% chance. This allows us to test for neuronal corre-
lates before choice (during appearance of first alternative), during
choice, and after choice (RPE) (for a more detailed description of
this procedure see Supplementary Material).
Subjects’ and receivers’ payoffs varied independently among
4, 6, 10, 16, and 20 Euros, and payoff alternatives were ran-
domly chosen from all possible unique combinations. This led to
four qualitatively distinguishable decision situations: “pure self-
interest” (PSI), “non-costly social” (NCS), “efficiency” (E) and
“costly social” (CS) situations (The generation of decision situa-
tions is explained in detail in the Supplementary Material). In the
costly social situations, subjects could choose to forgo monetary
advantages in order to allocate more money to the receiver (e.g.,
favoring 6C for themselves and 16C for the receiver over 10C for
both). In this situation, subjects had to trade material self-interest
with altruistic preferences. The other three situations do not entail
a conflict between different motives because one alternative is
unequivocally advantageous with respect to self-interest motives
(PSI), efficiency (NCS), or both motives (E). The non-conflicting
nature of the NCS-condition was created by keeping the sub-
ject’s payoff constant in the two alternatives and only varying the
receiver’s outcome (See Table 1: 6/10 vs. 6/4). In this situation
the subjects can choose the alternative with the higher outcome
for the other participant without affecting the own outcome. The
PSI condition was constructed in an equivalent manner by keep-
ing the receiver’s payoff constant and varying the subject’s payoff
(e.g., 10/6 vs. 4/6). In the efficient condition one alternative con-
sisted of higher payoffs for decision-maker and receiver (16/10 vs.
10/6). Subjects were presented with 40 decisions of each condition
in random order, resulting in 160 decisions in total. The exper-
imental paradigm was adopted from our previous study (Kuss
et al., 2013).
In order to characterize the neuronal correlates of social
decision-making, the analysis of fMRI-data concentrates on the
following comparison (time-point of choice, see Figure 1B): the
contrast between social decisions in the NCS-condition with
self-interested choices in the PSI-condition (NCS > PSI). This
contrast is of special interest, because conditions are formally
equivalent (no conflict of motives, 1 payoff per alternative is the
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Table 1 | The four decision situations and their underlying
payoff-structures including percentages of trials in which subjects
chose the left alternative in each condition separately for prosocials
and proselfs (selfish participants).
Decision Percentage of trials averaged across subjects
situation (mean ± SD)
Prosocials Proselfs t-value (p)
Pure self-interest
(PSI) e.g., 10/6 4/6
94.1% (± 12.92%) 95% (± 12.11%) −0.22 (0.829)
Efficiency (E) e.g.,
16/10 4/6
95.5% (± 8.96%) 95% (± 12.53%) 0.14 (0.886)
Non-costly social
(NCS) e.g., 6/10 6/4
90.3% (± 16.25%) 92.1% (± 12.7%) −0.36 (0.724)
Costly social (CS)
e.g., 4/10 10/6
19.6% (± 16.32%) 6.9% (± 10.94%) 2.79 (0.008)
same) and conditions differ only in the decision’s consequence
with NCS-choices affecting the receiver’s payoff and PSI-choices
affecting the decision-maker’s payoff. The events of costly social
decisions (costly-social condition) were too rare to be considered
in the fMRI-analysis.
TECHNICAL DETAILS
Scanning was performed on a 1.5T Avanto scanner (Siemens,
Erlangen, Germany) using standard scanning parameters for the
acquisition of 31 axial EPI slices with a TR of 2.5s (for details
see Supplementary Material). The experiment was presented by
Presentation® software version 14.9 (Neurobehavioral Systems,
Albana, Canada) via video goggles (Nordic Neuro Lab, Norway)
and subjects gave their answer by button presses on MRI-suited
response grips (Nordic Neuro Lab).
fMRI ANALYSIS
We included three events in the first level general linear model
(GLM): onset of the appearance of the first alternative includ-
ing parametric modulators representing the subject’s payoff and
the receiver’s payoff (event 1), different onset-regressors depend-
ing on the decision situations (event 2), onset of RPE-induction
including two parametric modulators representing the RPE of the
subject’s and the receiver’s payoff (event 3). Regarding event 2,
the following decision-types were modeled in the GLM: In the
PSI condition trials where subjects chose the self-interest alter-
native (PSI+), in the NCS-condition trials where subjects choose
the prosocial alternative (NCS+), in the E-condition trials where
subjects chose the efficient alternative (E+), in the CS-condition
trials where subjects chose the prosocial alternative (CS+), and
trials where subjects chose the self-interest alternative (CS−). All
decisions, except prosocial decision in the costly social condition
(CS+), were made with a certain frequency to be considered as a
reliable regressor in the GLM (at least 20 decisions per condition).
Importantly, the parametric regressor for the others’s payoff
in event 1 and event 3 were entered after the subject’s payoff
regressors and regressors were orthogonalized in ascending order.
This means that in case of shared variance between these regres-
sors, all commonly explained BOLD variance was attributed to
the subject’s regressors, yielding an independent and conservative
estimate for the effect of the receiver’s payoff regressors.
In order to test our hypotheses we contrasted the following
decision types to describe the neuronal correlates of social deci-
sion making during event 2. We contrasted social decisions in
NCS- and E-condition with self-interested decision in the PSI-
condition (NCS> PSI, E> PSI). For this decision-related activity,
we build differential t-contrasts on first level. Prosocial deci-
sions in the CS-condition (CS+) were too rare to have reliable
parameter estimates. We subjected the regressors of the paramet-
ric modulators of event 1 and event 3 to one-sample t-tests. We
tested all contrasts in the whole sample (n = 36) and for group
differences (prosocial versus selfish participants).
The voxel-level threshold was set to 0.005 (uncorrected). We
applied a whole-brain cluster-level family-wise error (FWE) cor-
rection for multiple comparisons with a cluster-p-value of 0.05.
Additionally we applied a small-volume correction for a-priori
defined Regions of Interest (ROI).
ROI DEFINITION
We defined regions known to be involved in valuation and
reward processing as regions of interest, namely the Nucleus
Accumbens (NAcc) and the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC).
Additionally, we were interested in the subgenual ACC, as this
region was shown to be involved in reward-processing in a social
context (Moll et al., 2006; Kuss et al., 2013). We derived anatom-
ical masks of these regions from the Harvard-Oxford cortical
and subcortical structural atlases (http://www.cma.mgh.harvard.
edu), applying a probability of 0.5. Further we used the AAL as
implemented in SPM 8 to derive masks for Caudate and Putamen
as approximation to a mask for the Ventral Striatum.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Decisions in conditions without conflict (non-costly social and
efficiency) demonstrate that individuals make social decisions
that profit the other person at no cost to self-interest (Table 1). In
pure self-interest (PSI), non-costly social (NCS) and efficiency (E)
situations, all subjects consistently chose the advantageous alter-
native (>92% of all trials over all subjects): the choices in PSI were
advantageous with respect to self-interest, in NCS advantageous
with respect to social gain, and in E advantageous with respect
to both. Table 1 shows the choice behavior in the four conditions
separately for prosocial and selfish individuals.
In costly social situations which were characterized by a con-
flict between prosocial and self-interest motives, prosocial partic-
ipants were more often willing to forgo ownmonetary advantages
in order to distribute more money to the receiver. Prosocials more
often chose the prosocial alternative in this condition when com-
pared to selfish participants. For the other conditions there was
no significant difference in choice behavior between the groups
(see Table 1).
In the analysis of reaction-times we considered decisions
that were also included in the GLM of the fMRI-analysis.
Reaction-time refers to the event where subjects choose one
alternative (Figure 1B) and is defined as time from appear-
ance of the second alternative (Figure 1B) until button press
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(choosing one alternative).There was a significant difference in
reaction-times between conditions [F(3, 102) = 41.13, p < 0.001]
and an interaction-effect [condition X group: F(3, 102) = 14.59,
p < 0.001]. Reaction-times are shown in Figure 2, separately
for prosocials and selfish participants. Prosocials took longer
to decide in every experimental condition compared to self-
ish individuals. The group-differences were significant in PSI-
condition [t(34) = 2.21, p = 0.034] and for egoistic decisions
in CS-condition [t(34) = 3.29, p = 0.002]. The group-difference
reaches a trend for choices in the E-condition [t(34) = 1.74,
p = 0.09], while there was no significant difference observed
in the NCS-condition [t(34) = 0.52, p = 0.609]. The pattern of
reaction-time-differences is remarkable: Prosocials took longest
for egoistic choices in the costly-social condition, whereas selfish
participants took longest for social choices in the non-costly-
social condition.
fMRI-RESULTS
The aim of the study was to describe differences in neuronal cor-
relates of social-decision making between selfish- and prosocial-
oriented subjects. After reporting results in the whole sample
(n = 36), we present the group-difference between prosocial
(n = 20) and selfish participants (n = 16) for the contrast of
main interest (NCS> PSI).
Non-costly social decisions (NCS) compared to self-interested
choices (PSI) were associated with activations in two clusters
located in medial frontal regions. One cluster was located in ven-
tromedial areas, including the medial orbitofrontal cortex (from
now on: ventromedial prefrontal cortex, vmPFC). The other clus-
ter is more dorsal, located in BA9 (from now on: dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex, dmPFC). Those two clusters survive correction
for multiple comparison on a whole brain level: Non-costly social
decisions (NCS) were associated with a stronger BOLD-Signal in
the vmPFC [NCS > PSI: MNI-coordinates of peak voxel: X =
0, Y = 35, Z = 4, t = 5.53, k = 340, pFWE(whole brain cluster
level)<0.05] and in the dmPFC [NCS > PSI: MNI-coordinates
of peak voxel: X = −9, Y = 56, Z = 34, t = 4.15, k = 204,
pFWE(whole brain cluster level)<0.05], as shown in Figure 3.
FIGURE 2 | Reaction-times in the four conditions separately for the
group of prosocial and selfish participants. PSI, choosing the
self-interest alternative in pure self-interest condition; E, choosing efficient
alternative in efficiency condition; NCS, choosing social alternative in the
non-costly social condition; CS ego, choosing the self-interest alternative in
costly-social condition. ∗p < 0.05; (∗)p < 0.1.
For the opposite contrasts (PSI > NCS), there was no activa-
tion in reward-related areas that survived correction for multiple
comparisons.
These correlates of social decision making (NCS > PSI) were
tested for group-differences between prosocial and selfish partic-
ipants. There was no stronger activity in the group of prosocials
(prosocials> proselfs). Instead there was a stronger BOLD-signal
in the group of proselfs for social compared to self-interested
choices (NCS > PSI) in the dmPFC [MNI-coordinates of peak
voxel: X = 0, Y = 32, Z = 34, t = 3.86, k = 172, pFWE(whole
brain cluster level)<0.05] and in the mOFC [MNI-coordinates
of peak voxel: X = 6, Y = 47, Z = −14, t = 5.01, pFWE(small-
volume corrected)<0.05] when compared with the group of
prosocials (proselfs > prosocials, see Figure 4).
Further results of prosocial decision making in the efficient
condition and results of the RPE-event are reported in the
Supplementary Material.
DISCUSSION
This study demonstrates inter-individual differences in behav-
ioral and neuronal correlates of prosocial preferences between
prosocial and selfish individuals (Van Lange, 1999). We found
that prosocials more frequently choose to allocate money to the
receiver despite own losses in the costly social condition upon
comparison to selfish pariticipants. This finding is more or less
circular because the SVOmeasure used to discriminate the groups
actually uses a very similar task. In fact, this result implies a valida-
tion for the fact that our fMRI paradigm resembles the definition
of the SVO concept.
For the purpose of this paper, we focused on a condition
where subjects could make prosocial choices (administering more
money to the receiver) without any consequences for the own
FIGURE 3 | Stronger BOLD-signal for non-costly social choices
compared to pure-self interested choices (NCS > PSI) in vmPFC and
dmPFC in the whole sample (n = 36). MNI: X = −3, Y = 35, Z = 2,
thresholded at t > 2.73, corresponding to p < 0.005.
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FIGURE 4 | Stronger BOLD-signal in the group of selfish participants
for social compared to self-interested choices (NCS > PSI) in the
dmPFC (A) and mOFC (B). (A) MNI: X = −3, Z = 22. (B) MNI: X = 6.
Both are thresholded at t > 2.73, corresponding to p < 0.005.
payoff (non-costly social condition). In this condition the large
majority of subjects chose the prosocial alternative and selfish and
prosocial participants did not differ in this issue. Crucially we
investigated reaction time differences and differences in BOLD
signal during those choices in order to elucidate the underlying
cognitive processes and their differences in the two groups.
Reaction times were significantly longer in prosocial than in
selfish individuals in all conditions except for the non-costly social
(NCS) condition yielding a significant group x condition inter-
action. A similar interaction was found for BOLD activity in
the vmPFC and dmPFC, where the contrast between NCS and
PSI (pure self-interest) was larger for selfish than for prosocial
individuals. The NCS condition is the only condition where self-
beneficial choices cannot be made. Selfish individuals are there-
fore required to overcome their default of primarily considering
their own outcome.
GROUP DIFFERENCES IN REACTION TIMES AS INDICATORS OF AN
EGOISTIC DEFAULT IN SELFISH INDIVIDUALS
One possibility to experimentally disentangle automated and
controlled processes is to manipulate cognitive load (Satpute and
Lieberman, 2006). Cornelissen et al. (2011) studied the effects
of social value orientation on prosocial behavior in a dictator-
game under cognitive load during which prosocials transferred
moremoney to the recipient compared to selfish participants. The
authors concluded that chronically accessible values are automat-
ically transferred into behavior.
In our paradigm, group differences in reaction-times allow for
conclusions on the automaticity of decision-processes in proso-
cial and selfish participants. Selfish participants react faster in
all conditions compared to prosocials. Those differences were
significant, except for non-costly social decisions. We assume
that selfish participants automatically chose the options with the
higher payoff for themselves. This option is easy to determine in
all conditions, except for the non-costly social condition (here the
own payoff is constant in both alternatives). In this condition,
selfish-oriented participants are prompted to look at the payoff
for the receiver and take it into account. Prosocial-oriented partic-
ipants instead consider the receiver’s payoff in all decisions, thus
taking longer to decide in general.
This is clearly the case in the costly social condition: Here
prosocial participants take very long to decide, which reflects
the conflict between self-interest and prosocial motives in this
condition. Selfish participants instead are quite fast in this deci-
sion, presumably because they use the heuristic of choosing the
alternative with the highest payoff for themselves. While the fast
reactions of selfish participants can be regarded as an indicator
of intuition in following an egoistic decision default, the slow
responses of prosocials can be seen as an indicator of delib-
eration in the costly social condition where self-interest and
prosocial motives are in conflict (Rubinstein, 2007; Kahneman,
2011). In the underlying value-based decision process, proso-
cials obviously place a positive value on the outcome of the
other person, whereas selfish indiviuals primarily value their own
outcomes.
NEURAL CORRELATES OF OVERRIDING THIS EGOISTIC DEFAULT IN
AREAS OF VALUE COMPUTATION, COGNITIVE CONTROL AND SOCIAL
COGNITION ARE MORE PRONOUNCED IN SELFISH INDIVIDUALS
Our results demonstrate activity during social choices in brain
areas that are associated with on the one hand (1) subjective
(reward-) value (mOFC, vmPFC) and on the other hand (2) the-
ory of mind, executive function and cognitive control (dmPFC).
Besides its reward-related function, the vmPFC is also asso-
ciated with the integration of costs and benefits (De Quervain
et al., 2004; Basten et al., 2010) and with choosing alternatives
with high subjective value (Rangel and Hare, 2010; Bartra et al.,
2013). Decisions in our paradigm require the integration of the
value of the personal payoff and the value of the receiver‘s payoff
into one subjective value. The vmPFC activity in our paradigm
was observed for non-costly social decisions. Non-costly social
choices in our paradigm induce selfish individuals to consider the
payoff of another person, and thus induces a valuation-process
that adds on the selfish default of considering mainly their own
payoff. The vmPFC activity was stronger in the group of self-
ish participants implying higher demand on value computation
in selfish individuals, compared to the more intuitive prosocial
decisions of prosocials.
In a similar vein, higher activity in the dmPFC in selfish
individuals during non-costly social choices can be seen as a cor-
relate of reflection and displays the need of cognitive resources
(and thus less automaticity) in individuals who primarily use an
egoistic decision default.
The dmPFC is associated with cognitive control and con-
trolled forms of social cognition as opposed to automatic forms
of social cognition (Satpute and Lieberman, 2006; Lieberman,
2007). Different cognitive processes have been reported to be
associated with dmPFC activity, especially for tasks that require
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cognitive control and computational load (e.g., Elliott and Dolan
(1998) for higher cognitive demands during hypothesis testing;
Ferstl and von Cramon (2002) during coherency processing of
speech; Berthoz et al. (2002) during processing of norm viola-
tions; Decety et al. (2004) during competition). Those results
demonstrate the dmPFC’ s role for the maintenance of non-
automated cognitive processes and hint at a more general and
domain-independent function (Ferstl and von Cramon, 2002). In
this vein, the dmPFC activity during non-costly social choices can
be regarded as an indicator of a reflective cognitive process, which
is stronger in selfish-oriented participants.
The dmPFC (BA9) is also associated with the processing
of socially relevant stimuli, theory of mind and mentalizing
(Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Saxe, 2006). Stronger activation dur-
ing social decisions in selfish participants could also reflect a
higher demand of theory of mind- and executive-functions in
this group. In a similar vein, Krueger et al. (2007) report group-
differences in BA 9 during the course of a trust-game: the group of
participants that did not experience reciprocity in the first half of
the experiment had stronger activity in BA9 compared to partici-
pants who experienced their trust being reciprocated. Participants
that did not experience reciprocity rely more on mentalizing pro-
cesses in order to predict the behavior of the other. Participants
that did however experience reciprocity during the game, trust
more automatically and thus demand fewer mentalizing pro-
cesses. (Krueger et al., 2007).This parallels our group-differences
during social choices in BA9, because we assume prosocials
to use social cognition more automatically compared to selfish
individuals.
Neural indicators for a reward value of prosocial decisions
were observed as well. Activity in the mOFC and vmPFC during
social choices imply that decisions, which profit another person
at no cost to the decision maker, carry an intrinsic reward-value.
Our results confirm results of previous studies that reported
reward-related activity during social choices in interactive coop-
eration paradigms (Decety et al., 2004; Rilling et al., 2004; Elliott
et al., 2006; Emonds et al., 2011), as well as in non-interactive
paradigms (Moll et al., 2006; Mobbs et al., 2009; Tricomi et al.,
2010; Zaki and Mitchell, 2011; Fareri et al., 2012).
To conclude, our results hint at the need for controlled
processes in prosocial decision making. Additionally prosocial
decisions at no cost to self-interest seem to have an intrinsic
reward-value. Furthermore our results demonstrate interindi-
vidual differences in neuronal correlates of prosocial decision
making. These decisions seem to recruit the need to overcome
the default of maximizing self-interest in selfish individuals,
which is accompanied by activity in areas associated with con-
trolled forms of social cognition such as the dmPFC (Lieberman,
2007) and areas associated with the integration of values such
as the vmPFC (Rangel and Hare, 2010). The results allow a
more detailed view on prosocial decision making that takes
interindividual differences into account: it does not seem to
be a question of deliberation versus intuition per se. Instead,
selfish-oriented individuals apply reflection and need cognitive
resources to overcome self-interest and act prosocially, whereas
prosocial-oriented individuals seem to rely more on intuitive
processes.
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